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UNITED STATES V. HATCH: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE
ABSTRACT
For decades, courts have struggled with the controversy over the
appropriate scope of congressional power. The battle between a broad,
deferential view and a narrow, limited view is the focus of many cases
interpreting grants of congressional authority by the Thirteenth and Four-
teenth Amendments. The Thirteenth Amendment is not commonly found
in contemporary legal analysis; however, power offered by the Amend-
ment, and the cases interpreting it, has noteworthy potential in our mod-
em society. Because the history and specificity of the Thirteenth
Amendment is so different from the Fourteenth Amendment, arguments
drawing strict correlation between the two should be scrutinized. Overly
restrictive limits on congressional power carry consequences and should
be carefully considered. Limitations to the Fourteenth Amendment have
brought criticism that must be analyzed when approaching similar action
with regard to the Thirteenth Amendment. Learning from, and avoiding
repeating, past mistakes i  a sign of a sophisticated and evolving society.
Such caution must be central to the imminent discussion of congressional
authority under the Thirteenth Amendment.
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INTRODUCTION
The Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
of America sought o rid the nation of its dark history of slavery and in-
voluntary servitude.1 Though the Amendment stands for the end of slav-
ery in the United States and a new direction after a brutal war, it is not
common to hear legal arguments or opinions today which revolve around
the powers inherent in the Thirteenth Amendment.2 Throughout our na-
tion's legal history, the Thirteenth Amendment's grant of power has been
a focal point of the struggle between broad and narrow interpretations of
congressional powers.3 And recently, the Tenth Circuit opened the door
for the Supreme Court to step in and answer the question of how far the
Thirteenth Amendment's power should extend.4 Does this portend a revi-
talization of the Thirteenth Amendment and invite a new avenue for
Congress to assert its power in the wake of recent decisions that chip
away at it?5 Is it fodder for the Supreme Court to step in to prevent such
a result? Or is it just a unique case about a unique law that will eventual-
ly fade away? This Comment examines these possibilities.
The Thirteenth Amendment returned as a source of congressional
power to enact the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act 6 (the Hate Crimes Act) when three white men tortured
and branded a Navajo man for seemingly no reason other than the fact
that he was Navajo.7 The Hate Crimes Act has recently become a focal
point of criticism of Congress's power to regulate private action.8 Federal
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude... shall exist
within the United States."); see Thirteenth Amendment, HISTORY,
http://www.history.com/topics/thirteenth-amendment (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) ("The [Thirteen]th
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution officially abolished slavery in America, and was ratified on
December 6, 1865, after the conclusion of the American Civil War.").
2. See Alexander Tsesis, Furthering American Freedom: Civil Rights & the Thirteenth
Amendment, 45 B.C. L. REV. 307, 310 (2004) (explaining that the Thirteenth Amendment, even
though ratified in 1865, is only just coming into the light of American jurisprudence).
3. The Court at the end of the nineteenth century initially interpreted the enforcement power
broadly-that it included the power to act against any "badges or incidents of slavery." The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883). Then the Court cut back and limited the congressional power to
enforce against slavery and involuntary servitude. Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1, 19 (1906),
overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). More recently, the Court
again adopted a more broad interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment's power to include the
power to enforce against the badges and incidents of slavery. Jones, 392 U.S. at 439.
4. United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 2013). Hatch filed a petition for a
writ of certiorari on October 1, 2013. No. 13-675: William Hatch v. United States, CERTPOOL,
https://certpool.com/dockets/13-6765 (last updated June. 25, 2014). The Supreme Court denied the
petition on Mar. 24, 2014. Id.
5. Supreme Court decisions in the past two decades have shown a tendency toward tighten-
ing congressional powers. See Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2577 (2012);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552
(1995).
6. Pub. L. No. 111-84, Div. E., 123 Stat. 2838 (2009) (codified in relevant part at 18 U.S.C.
§ 249 (2012)).
7. United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047 (D.N.M. 2011), affd sub nom. Hatch,
722 F.3d 1193.
8. See Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1195.
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hate-crime statutes serve as a battleground between federal power to pro-
tect people targeted because of an aspect of their person and private in-
terests in limiting federal regulation of activities without state action. A
conflict arises when laws like hate-crime statutes are enacted but infringe
on other perceived protected freedoms.9
This Comment presents the recent revitalization of the Thirteenth
Amendment in modem jurisprudence and seeks to analyze the conflict
inherent in the expansion and retraction of congressional powers. Part I
of this Comment presents an overview of statutes prohibiting hate
crimes. It then attempts to provide a historical and legal background for
the protections guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment, as well as the
Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Part II of
this Comment outlines the Tenth Circuit's approach to the constitutional-
ity of a hate-crime statute and demonstrates the modem analytical ap-
proach to revive the Thirteenth Amendment. It also outlines the facts,
procedural posture, and analysis used by the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in United States v. Hatch.10 Part III of this Comment addresses the
battle over the scope of congressional authority granted by enforcement
provisions similar to the Thirteenth Amendment's enforcement provision
at issue in Hatch. Finally, Part III discusses the controversy surrounding
the Supreme Court's treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment and argues
that extra caution should be taken when the Court is presented with the
task of imposing limits on the Thirteenth Amendment.
I. BACKGROUND
To fully understand the history leading to the Tenth Circuit's utili-
zation of the Thirteenth Amendment, it is necessary to look back to the
origins of our nation. From there, this Part moves quickly through history
to the addition of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution and its
historical interpretation and application. Finally, a brief introduction and
discussion of hate-crime statutes and presentation of the evolution of the
scope of the Thirteenth Amendment are both necessary to show how the
Amendment became central to the Tenth Circuit's opinion.
9. Hate-crime statutes have been challenged as infringements on protected speech and asso-
ciation. See infra note 70. These statutes have also been discussed as possible impermissible pun-
ishment of thoughts, also protected under the First Amendment. See Anne B. Ryan, Comment,
Punishing Thought: A Narrative Deconstructing the Interpretive Dance of Hate Crime Legislation,
35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 123, 132-33 (2001). Though these constitutional challenges are important,
they have been discussed at length elsewhere. See, e.g., Carter T. Coker, Note, Hope-Fulfilling or
Effectively Chilling? Reconciling the Hate Crimes Prevention Act with the First Amendment, 64
VAND. L. REV. 271, 283-95 (2011). This Comment, therefore, focuses primarily on the constitution-
al challenges discussed by the Tenth Circuit, including the Thirteenth Amendment and federalism
challenges raised by Hatch. See Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1201.
10. 722 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2013).
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A. Historical Application of the Thirteenth Amendment
The Declaration of Independence adopted John Locke's idea that all
men are endowed with certain inalienable rights." Among these inalien-
able rights was a guarantee of liberty.'2 After the Declaration, some
Americans considered that the Constitution's protection of liberty em-
bodied protections sufficient to rid the nation of slavery.13 However, it is
well-understood that the original Constitution failed to live up to the
Declaration's promise of liberty and equality in one major way-its
treatment of slavery. "4 It was not until the adoption of the Thirteenth
Amendment that the Constitution came more closely in line with the
Declaration. With the Thirteenth Amendment, the nation showed a re-
newed focus on equality, specifically on ending slavery in the United
States.'
5
Arising at the culmination of the bloodiest war ever fought on Unit-
ed States soil, 16 the Thirteenth Amendment was the first of the so-called
"Reconstruction Amendments" which were aimed specifically at ending
an era of slavery in the United States and preventing its return forever.'
7
The Thirteenth Amendment states, "Neither slavery nor involuntary ser-
vitude... shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to
their jurisdiction."' 8 It further provides that "Congress shall have power
to enforce this article by appropriate legislation."'9 The Thirty-eighth
Congress adopted the Thirteenth Amendment to end the long history of
slavery in the United States, but the early treatment of the powers of the
Thirteenth Amendment by the Supreme Court defined its grant of power
narrowly-no more than the abolition of slavery and power to prevent its
return.
20
The decades following the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment
show the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to fully adopt its provi-
11. Tsesis, supra note 2, at 315.
12. Id. at 316.
13. See id. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in relevant part
that "[n]o person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. V.
14. See Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the Constitution: The Declaration of Independence,
Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 361, 362-63 (1993) (explaining that the
Founders deliberately left the doctrine of equal rights embodied in the Declaration of Independence
out of the Bill of Rights because of fear that it would prevent the institution of slavery).
15. See Rebecca E. Zietlow, James Ashley's Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
1697, 1697 (2012).
16. American Civil War, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/american-civil-war (last
visited Apr. 16, 2014) ("[T]he Civil War proved to be the costliest war ever fought on American soil,
with some 620,000 of 2.4 million soldiers killed, millions more injured and the population and
territory of the [American] South devastated.").
17. See Tsesis, supra note 2, at 309 ("The historical context of the Thirteenth Amendment is
the abolitionist movement and the nation's decision to throw off its racist past.").
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2.
20. Tsesis, supra note 2, at 328.
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sions.21 The Court's analysis of the Thirteenth Amendment powers in the
Civil Rights Cases22 shows the demise of the usefulness of the Amend-
ment as a prohibition against historical infringement of civil rights and
liberties.23 The Civil Rights Cases analyzed the Thirteenth Amendment
in its discussion of the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875.24
The Supreme Court considered important principles of Thirteenth
Amendment jurisprudence; however, it ultimately concluded that the
Thirteenth Amendment did not suffice as constitutional grounds for the
Civil Rights Act of 1875.25 Specifically, the Court made special refer-
ence to the enforcement provision of the Thirteenth Amendment and
noted that "it is assumed that the power vested in Congress to enforce the
article by appropriate legislation[] clothes Congress with power to pass
all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United State[s]. 26 The Court, however, restricted the pow-
ers of the Thirteenth Amendment by holding that the Amendment did not
grant power to Congress to enact the Civil Rights Act.27 The Court's
language regarding the "badges and incidents of slavery" would resur-
face in later cases as a foundation of powers inherent in the Thirteenth
Amendment.28
After the turn of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court was
again presented with the question of the scope of power under the Thir-
teenth Amendment in Hodges v. United States.29 The Supreme Court in
Hodges resolved whether the Thirteenth Amendment provided sufficient
21. Id. at 329 ("In the years following Reconstruction, the U.S. Supreme Court undermined
the [r]adical ideals of universal freedom and, eventually, interpreted the [Thirteenth] Amendment so
narrowly that its holdings came to resemble the reasoning of congressmen who had voted against
[it].").
22. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). The Civil Rights Cases is a conglomeration of the cases challenging
the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Id. The opinion is commonly referenced for its
analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 476
(1968). This Comment focuses on the Court's use of the Thirteenth Amendment.
23. Baher Azmy, Unshackling the Thirteenth Amendment: Modern Slavery and a Recon-
structed Civil Rights Agenda, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 1000 (2002) (stating that "the Civil Rights
Cases[] operated as a judicial vice that squeezed the Thirteenth Amendment into a doctrinal sliver."
(footnote omitted)).
24. 109 U.S. at 9, 21.
25. Id. at 20, 24 (noting that the Thirteenth Amendment "is undoubtedly self-executing with-
out any ancillary legislation" and that "the Thirteenth Amendment may be regarded as nullifying all
State laws which establish or uphold slavery").
26. Id. at 20.
27. Id. at 25 ("On the whole, we are of opinion that no countenance of authority for the pas-
sage of [the Civil Rights Act of 1875] can be found in ... the Thirteenth ... Amendment of the
Constitution."); see Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 561, 588-89 (2012) ("[T]he Civil Rights Cases marked a critical moment for under-
standing the scope of Congress's Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power. The majority articulat-
ed what has become the authoritative view of the appropriate targets of congressional ac-
tion[,] ... however, the Civil Rights Cases embraced a view of the 'badges and incidents of slavery'
that substantially cabined Congress's Thirteenth Amendment power for the eighty-five years that
followed.").
28. See, e.g., United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1198-99 (10th Cir. 2013).
29. 203 U.S. 1, 6 (1906), overruled in part by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409
(1968).
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power to enable Congress to enact legislation preventing, among other
things, private threats at victims' places of employment.30 Focusing its
analysis on the powers granted to Congress by the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, the Court noted that "any congressional egislation directed against
individual action which was not warranted before the [Thirteenth]
Amendment must find authority in it." 3 1 Examining the language of the
Thirteenth Amendment, the Court concluded that the Amendment de-
nounced slavery and involuntary servitude and that Congress was grant-
ed the power to denounce both.32 The Court noted that the expansion of
the Thirteenth Amendment beyond the prevention of slavery and invol-
untary servitude was contrary to how the nation decided to approach
emancipation at the close of the Civil War.33 With that analysis in place,
the Court struck down the challenged laws as an unconstitutional use of
congressional power and outside the scope of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, which the Court refused to interpret any further beyond the exact
language of the Amendment.
34
B. Regeneration of the Badges and Incidents of Slavery
The narrow holdings from the Civil Rights Cases and Hodges held
their places until 1968, when, in the wake of evolving social values in the
United States,35 the Supreme Court abandoned its narrow Thirteenth
Amendment construction and paved the way for the Thirteenth Amend-
ment powers we see in effect today.3 6 The shift in treatment came with
the Court's decision in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.37 There, the Court
changed its view and held that Congress's enforcement power under the
Thirteenth Amendment extended to eliminate all racial barriers to renting
and purchasing property.38 The Jones Court made specific note of the
language in the Civil Rights Cases regarding Congress's power to legis-
late to prevent the badges and incidents of slavery.39 The Court discussed
the debate that occurred at the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1875
and ultimately decided that it was for Congress "rationally to determine
what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and ... to translate that
30. See id. The indictment arose from Sections 1977 and 5508 of the Revised Statutes of the
United States. Id. at 14.
31. Id. at 16.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 19 (noting that the nation gave the freed slaves the Fourteenth Amendment to make
them citizens, the Fifteenth Amendment to allow them to vote, and the Thirteenth Amendment to
ensure that slavery and involuntary servitude never existed again within the limits of the land).
34. Id. at 20. The Court's approach to the Thirteenth Amendment in Hodges represents the
height of narrow construction of the powers granted by the Amendment. See Mason McAward,
supra note 27, at 589 ("The Court held that Section 2 [of the Thirteenth Amendment] permitted
Congress to legislate regarding the actual condition of slavery, but not its badges and incidents.").
35. See Civil Rights Movement, HISTORY, http://www.history.com/topics/civil-rights-
movement (last visited Apr. 17, 2014).
36. See Mason McAward, supra note 27, at 590; Tsesis, supra note 2, at 339.
37. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
38. Id. at 444.
39. Id. at 439.
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determination into effective legislation."A0 This shift toward judicial def-
erence to Congress's determination of what the badges and incidents of
slavery actually are is central to the Jones decision and ultimately dictat-
ed the outcome of the Tenth Circuit's decision in Hatch.41
The Jones Court followed the line of cases flowing from the Su-
preme Court's decision in McCulloch v. Maryland,42 in which the Court
adopted a test for appropriate legislation by holding, "Let the end be le-
gitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are
not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the constitution,
are constitutional.43 The Jones Court found that the Act in question,
42 U.S.C. § 1982,44 encompassed a legitimate end reached by legitimate
means.45 The Court upheld the law as appropriate legislation under Con-
gress's power to rationally determine the badges and incidents of slavery
and to legislate against them.46 Further, by upholding such an act, the
Court in Jones expanded the scope of congressional power under the
Thirteenth Amendment by holding that Congress's power extended to
legislate against purely private action.47
Cases that followed upheld the Jones interpretation of Thirteenth
Amendment power. In Griffin v. Breckenridge,48 the Supreme Court re-
lied on Jones to uphold a federal law targeting private action.49 The
Court outlined the Jones holding and found that the enforcement provi-
sion of the Thirteenth Amendment, when coupled with the holding in
Jones, gave Congress the power to protect African-American citizens
from private racist actions taken against hem.50 More recently, in United
40. Id. at 440.
41. United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1195 (10th Cir. 2013).
42. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
43. Jones, 392 U.S. at 443-44 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118 (1866))
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421 (providing the original
source of the quotation).
44. The Act provided equal access to rental and purchase of property. Jones, 392 U.S. at 420-
22 (explaining that § 1982 prohibited "all [racial] discrimination... in the sale and rental of proper-
ty-discrimination by private owners as well as ... public authorities.").
45. Id. at 444.
46. Id.
47. William M. Carter, Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial Profil-
ing, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17, 90 (2004).
48. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
49. Id. at 105. The Court upheld the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), which, as the
Court explained, fully encompassed the conduct of private persons. Id. at 96. The Act itself criminal-
ized the conspiracy of two or more individuals who "go in disguise on the highway.., for the pur-
pose of depriving.., any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws." Id. at 92
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 104-05. In Griffin, Defendants, who were Caucasian, stopped the African-American
victims on a highway and detained, assaulted, beat, and injured them. Id. at 90-91. The Court deter-
mined that the right to travel by way of the interstate highways was a privilege of national citizen-
ship and concluded that Congress was within its power granted by the Thirteenth Amendment when
it created "a statutory cause of action for [African-American] citizens who have been the victims of
conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at depriving them of the basic rights that
the law secures to all free men." Id. at 105-06.
2014]
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States v. Nelson,51 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals applied a similar
analysis in upholding a federal hate-crime statute protecting individuals
from private criminal activity targeting victims because of race, color,
52religion, or natural origin. The Second Circuit presented a detailed his-
tory of the evolution of Congress's power to enact laws under Section
Two of the Thirteenth Amendment.53 The court employed the Jones test
to decide whether Congress could have rationally determined that the
acts of violence delineated in the federal statute constituted a badge or
incident of slavery.54 Comparing the case to Griffin and Jones, the Se-
cond Circuit found that the statute in question "stop[ped] well short of
creating a general, undifferentiated federal law of criminal assault and
instead restricts its attention to acts ... [involving] discriminatory rela-
tionships with the victim. '55 The Second Circuit also found that under
Jones' badges and incidents language, the law was a constitutional exer-
cise of congressional power under the Thirteenth Amendment due to the
narrow application of the law to the discriminatory relationship.
56
With this modem approach to the badges and incidents of slavery,57
and with Jones's holding that it is the duty of Congress to rationally de-
termine the badges and incidents, the Thirteenth Amendment has been
effectively reinvented in contemporary American jurisprudence as a tool
to combat societal inequalities that still linger.
C. Hate-Crime Prevention Statutes
A hate crime is an attack on a person that is motivated by a charac-
teristic of the victim such as race, religion, gender, sexual orientation, or
ethnicity.58 Following findings of increased bias-motivated crimes
throughout the country, the federal government enacted multiple statutes
aimed at curbing these types of criminal behavior.59 Hate-crime preven-
tion statutes come in four main forms: institutional vandalism, sentence
enhancement, substantive offenses, and data collection.6 ° Usually, these
statutes seek to punish the motive behind a crime and impose heightened
51. 277 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2002).
52. Id. at 181-91.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 185.
55. Id. at 189.
56. Id. at 191.
57. For additional examples of decisions utilizing the post-Jones approach to the Thirteenth
Amendment, see, for example, United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 961 (1988) (Brennan, J.,
concurring); City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 124-29 (1981); Runyon v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 179 (1976); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226-27 (1971).
58. Ben Gillis, Note, Understanding Hate Crime Statutes and Building Towards a Better
System in Texas, 40 AM. J. CRIM. L. 197, 199 (2013) (citing Project, Crimes Motivated by Hatred:
The Constitutionality and Impact of Hate Crime Legislation in the United States, I SYRACUSE J.
LEGIS. & POL'Y 29, 31 (1995)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 201 (providing an in-depth explanation of each type of hate-crime statute).
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punishment for the crime. The requirements are generally summed up
to mean that hate-crime statutes seek to punish offenders who commit
crimes "because of' an animus against the individual victim.
62
Hate-crime legislation made its first entry into contemporary crimi-
nal law following the Civil Rights Act of 1968.63 The Act punished
threats or use of force to intimidate, injure, or interfere with any individ-
ual because of a characteristic like race, color, or religion.64 The next
modernization came in the 1990s when Congress passed the Hate Crime
Statistics Act65 and the Hate Crimes Sentencing Enhancement Act,66 both
of which paved the course for the hate-crime statutes in effect today.
67
After the bias-motivated murders of Matthew Shepard and James Byrd,
Jr., Congress passed its most recent hate-crime legislation.68 The Hate
Crimes Act is now codified in federal law and provides in relevant part:
Whoever, whether or not acting under color of law, willfully causes
bodily injury to any person or, through use of fire, a firearm, a dan-
gerous weapon, or an explosive or incendiary device, attempts to
cause bodily injury to any person, because of the actual or perceived
race, color, religion, or natural origin of any person.., shall be im-
prisoned not more than 10 years, fined in accordance with this title,
or both .... 69
The Hate Crimes Act targets criminal activity that is focused on an indi-
vidual because of a characteristic of that person.70 It is in this fashion that
modern criminal law has evolved to prevent such bias-motivated action.
61. Id. at 205; Margaret K. O'Leary, Note, Have No Fear (of "Piling Inference upon Infer-
ence'): How United States v. Comstock Can Save the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate
Crimes Prevention Act, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 931, 942-43 (2012) ("Hate-crime laws general-
ly... impose steeper penalties because bias is the motive for the crime. Numerous rationales have
been offered to support the passage of special hate-crime legislation. These rationales include deter-
rence, the necessity to differentiate such crimes because of their severity, and the imperative to
signal to potential offenders society's strong disapproval of such conduct." (footnote omitted)).
62. Gillis, supra note 58, at 207-08 (internal quotation marks omitted).
63. Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 534 (2012)).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. This Act was enacted as part of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994. Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 280003, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2012));
O'Leary, supra note 61, at 943 n.94.
67. See O'Leary, supra note 61, at 943.
68. Id. (citing Troy A. Scotting, Comment, Hate Crimes and the Need for Stronger Federal
Legislation, 34 AKRON L. REV. 853, 873-75 (2001)). In 1998, Matthew Shepard, a college student at
the University of Wyoming, died after he was kidnapped, robbed, pistol-whipped, and left tied to a
fence for eighteen hours in near-freezing temperatures because he was gay. James Brooke, Gay Man
Dies from Attack, Fanning Outrage and Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1998, at A1. In 1998, James
Byrd, Jr. died after he was picked up by three white men in his town in Texas, taken into the woods,
beaten, chained to the back of a pickup truck, and dragged behind the truck for two miles because he
was black. Carol Marie Cropper, Black Man Fatally Dragged in Possible Racial Killing, N.Y.
TIMES, June 10, 1998, at A16.
69. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012).
70. These laws have been the targets of constitutional challenges on a number of fronts in-
cluding the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468
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II. UNITED STATES V. HATCH
Recently, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals furthered the revival
of the Thirteenth Amendment in United States v. Hatch. The case exem-
plifies a continuing place in modem criminal jurisprudence for the Thir-
teenth Amendment and at the same time, presents an argument for the
restriction of congressional power under the Amendment.7' Following
the decision of the Tenth Circuit and its call to the Supreme Court to
address the arguments for and against the current Thirteenth Amendment
framework, Hatch filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme
Court.72 Below is a presentation of the facts, procedural posture, and
analysis from Hatch followed by a discussion of the ramifications of
different Supreme Court treatment of Thirteenth Amendment power.
A. Facts
V.K., the victim, is a mentally disabled Navajo man.73 In April
2010, he went into a McDonald's restaurant in Farmington, New Mexi-
co, where Paul Beebe was working.74 Beebe took the victim to his home
where William Hatch and Jesse Sanford met them.75 At Beebe's resi-
dence, defendants-Hatch, Beebe, and Sanford-assaulted and humiliat-
ed the victim. 76 Defendants shaved a swastika into the hair on the back of
the victim's head and wrote "White Power" and "KKK" into the shaved
lines.77 They then heated a wire hanger on the stove and branded a swas-
tika into the victim's right bicep.78 Next, the defendants told the victim
they would draw "feathers" and "native pride" on his back.79 Instead,
they drew lewd images, vulgar comments, and a pentagram labeled
"666" on the victim's back.80 The defendants made cell phone video re-
cordings of the branding and drawings.81
(2000) (presenting a challenge that he New Jersey hate-crime statute violated Defendant's Four-
teenth Amendment right to due process); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (holding that
Wisconsin's hate-crime statute did not violate Defendant's First Amendment rights); Glenn v. Hold-
er, 690 F.3d 417, 419 (6th Cir. 2012) (presenting a challenge to the Matthew Shepard and James
Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act as a violation of the rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment). The challenge presented to the Tenth Circuit, however, was different-it concerned the extent
of federal authority to legislate in this area at all. See United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1195
(10th Cir. 2013).
71. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1201-05.
72. A petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on October 1, 2013 and denied on Mar. 24,
2014. Supra note 4.
73. United States v. Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1047 (D.N.M. 2011) (referring to the
victim only as "V.K."), aff'd sub nom. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193.




77. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. Id.
79. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
80. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
81. Id.
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B. Procedural Posture
Defendants were originally charged under state law with kidnap-
ping, aggravated battery, and conspiracy to commit kidnapping and ag-
gravated battery.82 While the state prosecution was pending, the federal
government indicted the defendants for violating, and conspiracy to vio-
late, a portion of the federal Hate Crimes Act,83 which makes it a federal
crime to subject a person to violence because of race.84 Hatch was con-
victed of conspiracy to commit aggravated battery in the state court pro-
ceedings.85 In May 2011, the federal district court rejected defendants'
motion to dismiss the federal indictment.86 Hatch entered a conditional
guilty plea on the federal charge of conspiracy to violate the Hate Crimes
Act and preserved his right to challenge the constitutionality of the fed-
eral statute on appeal.87 After Hatch was sentenced in both the state and
federal proceedings, he appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals,
arguing that the portion of the Hate Crimes Act under which he was con-
victed, § 249(a)(1), is beyond any enumerated power of the federal gov-
ernment, including the Thirteenth Amendment."
C. The Tenth Circuit's Analysis in Hatch
The panel of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Hatch unani-
mously upheld the constitutionality of § 249(a)(1), concluding that Con-
gress acted within its power in enacting that portion of the Hate Crimes
Act.8 9 Judge Tymkovich wrote the opinion, joined by Judges Murphy
and O'Brien, and affirmed the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico.90
The Tenth Circuit began its discussion with an overview of the Re-
construction Amendments.9' The court then honed in on the most rele-
vant of the three Reconstruction Amendments for its analysis: the Thir-
teenth Amendment.92 Noting that, on its face, the Thirteenth Amendment
seems to only abolish and prevent the return of slavery and involuntary
servitude in the United States and its jurisdictions, the court explained
that the Supreme Court had clarified that the enforcement provision of
82. United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1196(10th Cir. 2013).
83. 18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) (2012).
84. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1196.
85. Id.
86. Id. (citing Beebe, 807 F. Supp. 2d 1045) (rejecting defendants' challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the federal hate-crime statute).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1195.
90. Id.
91. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
which were enacted at the end of, and in the years following, the Civil War, are generally referred to
as the "Reconstruction Amendments." See id. at 1196.
92. ld. at 1197.
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the Thirteenth Amendment also extends to "eradicating slavery's linger-
ing effects, or at least some of them."
93
The Tenth Circuit first addressed and outlined the historical evolu-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment to include Congress's power to abol-
ish the badges and incidents of slavery.94 The court outlined the Civil
Rights Cases where the Supreme Court first mentioned the possibility of
the Thirteenth Amendment expanding beyond a mere protection against
slavery.95 Acknowledging the narrow holding in the Civil Rights Cases,
the court moved its analysis to an overview of the evolution of the badg-
es and incidents of slavery, noting that the phrase as a whole has become
the generally accepted judicial gloss on the Thirteenth Amendment con-
gressional power.96 In its discussion of Hodges, the Tenth Circuit pre-
sented one main concern regarding the expansion of the Thirteenth
Amendment to include private badges and incidents-that it would lead
to overly broad congressional power over private action.
97
The court next addressed the shift in treatment of the Thirteenth
Amendment away from the narrow holding from the Civil Rights Cases
and Hodges and presented the backdrop for its conclusion that the
Amendment is available in modem jurisprudence as a source of congres-
sional power beyond simply preventing the return of slavery.98 Here,
Judge Tymkovich focused his analysis on the holding of Jones where the
Supreme Court expanded the usage of badges and incidents of slavery as
constitutional congressional authority for enacting legislation preventing
biased treatment in the real estate market.99 The Tenth Circuit recognized
that Jones expanded the congressional power by holding that Congress
has the power to rationally determine what the badges and incidents of
slavery are in order to pass legislation to eliminate them.00 The Tenth
Circuit ended its historical discussion by concluding that "after these
cases the Thirteenth Amendment can be seen as treating most forms of
racial discrimination as badges and incidents of slavery, and that Con-
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1197-200.
95. Id. at 1197-98 ("[lI]t is assumed that the power vested in Congress to enforce the article by
appropriate legislation, clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abol-
ishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States .... (emphasis omitted) (quoting The
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883))).
96. Id. at 1198.
97. Id. at 1199 ("In other words, the Court in Hodges reasoned that if badges-and-incidents
extends to the type of conduct at issue there and if Congress's badges-and-incidents authority applies
to all races, then Congress could legislate against 'every act done to an individual which was wrong
if done to a free man, and yet justified in a condition of slavery."' (quoting Hodges v. United States,
203 U.S. 1, 19 (1906), overruled inpart by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968))).
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1199-1200.
100. Id. at 1200.
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gress not only has the power to enforce the amendment, but also to a
certain extent define its meaning."
'101
Judge Tymkovich next discussed the Hate Crimes Act and, after in-
troducing the relevant sections and Congress's cited purposes and au-
thority for enacting it, the court considered the substance of Hatch's con-
stitutional claims.0 2 The court quickly determined that, under Jones, if
Congress rationally determines something-such as racial violence-is a
badge or incident of slavery, Congress may broadly legislate against 
it.'03
Applying the rational-determination test from Jones to the Hate Crimes
Act at issue in Hatch, the court concluded that it was indeed rational for
Congress to conclude that racial violence is a badge or incident of slav-
ery and that the Hate Crimes Act is therefore a constitutional exercise of
congressional power.104
Discussing the various arguments made by Hatch, the court left
some of these issues for the Supreme Court to decide.105 Hatch argued
that under the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate against the badg-
es and incidents of slavery should be left to the states.0 6 The Tenth Cir-
cuit quickly dismissed this challenge, holding that "when the Constitu-
tion explicitly grants Congress authority to act, the Tenth Amendment
gives way."'1 7 The court also analyzed Hatch's claims that recent Su-
preme Court treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment provides for more
limits on congressional power.0 8 Hatch argued that under City of Boerne
v. Flores,109 congressional power must be evaluated under a test for its
congruence and proportionality to the injury at stake."0 The court de-
scribed the issue but avoided ruling specifically on this argument, stating
that City of Boerne did not make mention of the Thirteenth Amendment
or Jones, and therefore Jones' rational-determination test was controlling
precedent for the Tenth Circuit, and the issue would need to be addressed
by the Supreme Court."' The court treated similarly Hatch's argument
that in light of United States v. Morrison
l
1
2 and United States v. Lopez,"
3
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1200-01. The Court presented the language of both subsections of § 249 but noted
that only § 249(a)(1) was in question. Id. The Court also outlined Congress's explicit announcement
that it enacted § 249 under its Thirteenth Amendment badges-and-incidents authority. Id.
103. Id. at 1201.
104. Id. at 1209.
105. See id. at 1201-02. Hatch raised many arguments to the constitutionality of § 249(a)(1),
the most significant of which was a federalism argument based on recent Supreme Court treatment
of post-Jones cases concerning the Tenth Amendment and Section Five of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Id. Hatch argued that the recent restrictions under these doctrines show that the congressional
power to determine and enforce against the badges and incidents of slavery is overly broad. Id
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1202 ("The Thirteenth Amendment, enacted after the Tenth Amendment, explicitly
gives Congress power to enforce its prohibitions.").
108. Id.
109. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
110. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1202.
111. Id. at 1202-05.
112. 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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two recent Commerce Clause cases, Jones creates a loophole for Con-
gress to enact otherwise impermissible police-power legislation.14 The
Tenth Circuit shared the concerns raised by Hatch but left consideration
of these arguments to the Supreme Court and reached its ultimate con-
clusion of the constitutionality of the Hate Crimes Act under the control-
ling authority of Jones." 5 Relying on stare decisis and Jones as the con-
trolling precedent for Thirteenth Amendment powers, the Tenth Circuit
"[left] it to the Supreme Court to bring Thirteenth Amendment jurispru-
dence in line with the structural concerns that prompted the limits [on
congressional power] announced in City of Boerne, Lopez, and Morri-
son."116
Judge Tymkovich, however, did not stop his analysis at stare deci-
sis. He explained why the Hate Crimes Act may be constitutional even
given the recent shift away from unfettered congressional discretion."
17
Judge Tymkovich explained that the Hate Crimes Act presents a more
narrow approach to congressional power than what Jones allows."8 With
an emphasis on limiting principles imbedded in the Hate Crimes Act,
Judge Tymkovich showed that Congress actually included checks within
§ 249(a)(1), making this specific Act much more narrow and limited than
other actions the Jones test may allow.119 He wrote that § 249(a)(1) actu-
ally focuses on three connected considerations: (1) the salient character-
istic of the victim, (2) the state of mind of the person subjecting the vic-
tim to some prohibited conduct, and (3) the prohibited conduct itself.
120
The discussion further outlined each of these elements and concluded
that by requiring consideration of these elements on a case-by-case basis,
the Jones precedent clearly supports § 249(a)(1).1
2 1
Finally, the Tenth Circuit addressed and rejected Hatch's final ar-
guments that the certification requirement 22 under the Hate Crimes Act
113. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
114. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1203-04.
115. Id. at 1204-05 ("While this debate raises worthwhile questions, the Supreme Court has
never revisited the rational determination test it established in Jones. And more importantly for our
purposes, none of the federalism authorities Hatch cites mention Jones or the Thirteenth Amend-
ment. Thus, even if we assume Hatch's authorities impliedly undermine Jones's approach to the
Thirteenth Amendment, we may not blaze a new constitutional trail simply on that basis: 'If a prece-
dent of [the Supreme] Court has direct application in a case ... yet appears to rest on reasons reject-
ed in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly con-
trols, leaving to [the Supreme] Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions."' (alterations in
original) (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989))).
116. Id. at 1205.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1205-06.
119. Id. at 1205 ("Although 'badges and incidents of slavery' could be interpreted as giving
Congress authority to legislate regarding nearly every social ill (because nearly all can be analogized
to slavery or servitude), [§ 249(a)(1)] does not take such an approach,").
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1206.
122. 18 U.S.C. § 249(b) (2012). The Act requires that the Attorney General certify in writing
that the state in which the crime was committed does not have jurisdiction or wants the federal
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is unconstitutional and that the Hate Crimes Act constitutes a violation of
equal protection. 123 The court dismissed both of these arguments, stating
that they have no constitutional significance.124 Having addressed and
dismissed Hatch's arguments and having left consideration of the feder-
alism concerns for the Supreme Court to resolve should it see reason to
do so, the Tenth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of
18 U.S.C. § 249(a)(1) as a valid exercise of congressional power under
Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment and affirmed Hatch's convic-
tion. 121
III. DISCUSSION
The decision of the Tenth Circuit exemplifies a proper use of consti-
tutional construction and inquiry to find a source of power for the enact-
ment of a statute. But the analysis of the court, and the precedent relied
on, leaves the question: how far should it go? To answer this question it
is first necessary to revisit the Tenth Circuit's approach in Hatch and the
court's approach to Hatch's "loophole" argument.126 Next, analysis of the
Supreme Court's treatment of the Fourteenth Amendment's enforcement
provision and the criticism that followed shows the necessity for judicial
scrutiny when attempting a similar approach with regard to the Thir-
teenth Amendment.
A. The Tenth Circuit's Decision
The court in Hatch was correct in upholding the constitutionality of
the Hate Crimes Act. The Tenth Circuit gave rejuvenated emphasis to the
Thirteenth Amendment as a power that is alive and active in contempo-
rary American jurisprudence. The court in Hatch grounded its analysis in
the Jones precedent, conducting a rational-basis inquiry into congres-
sional power and the badges and incidents of slavery.127 But the Tenth
Circuit left determination of the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment
power and Jones to the Supreme Court. 128 In modern society, the Thir-teenth Amendment remains a sparsely used source of congressional au-
government to prosecute the case instead of the state. Id. Hatch challenged this requirement arguing
that it is itself a type of congruence-and-proportionality test as was presented in City of Boerne.
Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1207.
123. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1207-08.
124. Id. at 1208 ("We therefore see no merit in Hatch's argument that the Hate Crimes Act's
certification requirement somehow proves the need for congruence and proportionality, or the lack
of it in this case."). The Tenth Circuit noted that although Jones overruled the main portion of Hodg-
es, Hodges still held that the Thirteenth Amendment applied to all races and the power extended to
Congress to legislate to protect all races, Id. at 1208-09 (clarifying that, "[i]n any event, Hatch's
argument does not raise an equal protection problem .... [T]he legal guarantee of equal protection is
not a supraconstitutional principle by which the Constitution itself is judged .... [Section 
2
49(a)(1)]
does not run afoul of equal protection principles").
125. Id. at 1209.
126. Id. at 1203-04.
127. Id. at 1201.
128. Id.
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thority.' 29 Will it become more popular as a source of congressional
power as other sources become interpreted more narrowly?3 ' The an-
swer remains to be seen.' 3  Examination of Hatch's arguments, the Su-
preme Court's recent treatment of similar issues, scholarly criticism of
the Supreme Court's decisions, and the Thirteenth Amendment's scope
of power and limitations, sheds a sliver of light on the topic.
B. Hatch's Federalism Arguments
Hatch made multiple arguments against the constitutionality of the
Hate Crimes Act.'32 His main argument was that the Hate Crimes Act is
"impermissible [federal] police power legislation."1 33 Hatch argued that
City of Boerne demonstrates the need for limits on federal power.'
34
Hatch's argument is interesting, and the Tenth Circuit called upon the
Supreme Court to fully flesh out the federalism concerns inherent in
Thirteenth Amendment congressional power.'
35
In City of Boerne, in analyzing the constitutionality of the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)136 as applied to the states, the
Supreme Court adopted a congruence-and-proportionality test for deter-
mining when Congress may have overstepped its powers under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment.137 Hatch argued that by imposing the
congruence-and-proportionality test on the enforcement clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court showed its desire to limit the
129. Tsesis, supra note 2, at 349.
130. See id. at 350.
131. Hatch filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court on October 1, 2013.
Supra note 4. The Court denied the petition on Mar. 24, 2014. Id.
132. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1201-09.
133. Id. at 1203-04.
134. Id. at 1202. The Tenth Circuit explained that the Supreme Court in City of Boerne ad-
dressed Congress's power under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment and the inherent prob-
lems with unlimited congressional discretion to define the scope of its power. "The Court acknowl-
edged that Section 5 ... gives Congress important powers, but '[i]f Congress could define its [Sec-
tion 5] powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution
be superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means."' Id. (alterations in original) (quoting
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997)).
135. Id. at 1201.
136. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (2012).
137. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520 (noting that the congruence-and-proportionality test
requires a reviewing court to balance the harm Congress seeks to prevent by its action and the means
Congress adopts to prevent the harm). Congress's Section Five power involves a similar enforce-
ment provision as in Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment. See Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1202. The
Court in City of Boerne determined that the evolution of Congress's enforcement power under the
Fourteenth Amendment showed it was meant to be a remedial power rather than authority for sub-
stantive congressional power. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 527. Therefore, the Court concluded that
the power vested in Congress under Section Five was merely the power to enact enforcement legisla-
tion. Id. at 529. In imposing limits to the enforcement power granted to Congress, the Court ex-
pressed its main federalism concern that "[i]f Congress could define its own powers by altering the
Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law,
unchangeable by ordinary means.' It would be 'on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like
other acts,... alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it."' Id. (omission in original) (quot-
ing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
UNITED STATES V HATCH
enforcement powers of Congress.138 Following this logic, it would have
been possible for the Tenth Circuit-and remains possible for future Su-
preme Court decisions-to impose similar limitations on the enforcement
provision of the Thirteenth Amendment.'39 This sort of limitation must
be approached carefully with an eye towards how City of Boerne affected
the Fourteenth Amendment and how similar treatment could affect the
Thirteenth Amendment.
The City of Boerne Court described the enforcement provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment as allowing Congress only to adopt remedial
enforcement provisions rather than define its own power and adopt sub-
stantive restrictions on the States as it did with RFRA.'4° After City of
Boerne, the Supreme Court continued to narrow the scope of congres-
sional power, specifically Congress's Commerce Clause power.1 41 The
Court's decision in City of Boerne and the post-City of Boerne limita-
tions to congressional power were met with fierce backlash and criti-
cism. 42 Arguments against the Court's retraction of congressional partic-
ipation in defining the scope of the enforcement provisions focus on two
main principles established in City of Boerne and achieved through the
congruence-and-proportionality test: first, Section Five does not provide
the power for Congress to substantively define the scope of rights it may
protect; and second, congressional action to protect judicially defined
rights must be narrowly tailored to that specific right. 143 Concerning the
first principle, it is argued that historical inquiry shows the intent of the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment that Congress be the primary
source of enforcement of the Amendment.144 The Court, when keeping
historical intent in mind, should therefore give respect to the interpreta-
tions and enforcement legislation of Congress-RFRA being precisely
one of these methods of enforcement.45 Concerning the second princi-
ple, it is further argued that the Court's decision to subject congressional
enforcement to stringent narrow-tailoring scrutiny (congruence and pro-
portionality), a check more rigorous than any other check on Article I
138. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1202. The Hatch court further stated that "[City of Boerne] does,
however, note the Reconstruction-Era Congress's concern with ensuring that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not grant general police power to the national government." Id. at 1203.
139. See id. at 1202. The Hatch court did not follow Hatch's request to limit the Thirteenth
Amendment power but rather followed precedent and left the issue for the Supreme Court. See id.
140. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 545 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (providing a succinct summary
of the majority's holdings and reasoning).
141. Evan H. Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 Powers, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1127, 1129 (2001) ("For the first time in seven decades, the Supreme Court has begun
to narrow the scope of Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce."). "[M]ore of the Supreme
Court's major federalism cases in the last decade involved Section 5 than any other font of federal
power." Id. at 113 1.
142. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Comment, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of
City of Boeme v. Flores, 111 HARV. L. REV. 153, 153 (1997); Caminker, supra note 141, at 1132.
143. Caminker, supra note 141, at 1131.
144. McConnell, supra note 142, at 194.
145. Id. at 195.
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power, should not be defended.146 This sort of judicial strangulation of
congressional enforcement authority, as exemplified in City of Boerne,
threatens to engulf more Article I powers and other congressional en-
forcement provisions-provisions Congress might be better suited to
address and carry out as a representation of the voice of the people sub-
ject to its power.
147
Hatch's federalism argument is that Jones and the rational-
determination test (to determine whether something constitutes a badge
or incident of slavery) "create[] a constitutional loophole through which
Congress can enact all sorts of otherwise impermissible police power
legislation."'148 Hatch argued that this seemingly unrestricted source of
enforcement power mirrors the same problem as the City of Boerne
Court faced when it restricted congressional enforcement authority under
the Fourteenth Amendment.49 Therefore, the argument goes, similar
limiting treatment should be taken with respect to Thirteenth Amend-
ment congressional power and the broad grant of power under the Jones
rational-determination test.50 In support of this argument, Hatch ad-
dressed judicial treatment of Congress's Commerce Clause'5' power in
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison. The Hatch court
addressed these cases, noting that in each case the Supreme Court re-
stricted an expanding congressional power.152 The Court in City of
Boerne, Lopez, and Morrison established limits on the respective federal
powers, and Hatch's argument echoes this rationale.153 As the Tenth Cir-
cuit put it, "'Badges and incidents of slavery,' taken at face value, puts
emphasis solely on the conduct Congress seeks to prohibit, and it seems
to place few limits on what that conduct might be."'
' 54
Essentially, Hatch argued-and the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the
significance of the inquiry though left resolution of it to the Supreme
Court-that without specific limitations on the enforcement provision of
the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress will be able to legislate against a
plethora of actions, finding rational determinations of the badges and
146. Caminker, supra note 141, at 1133.
147. Id. at 1198-99.
148. United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2013).
149. Id. at 1201-04.
150. Id.
151. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. The power to regulate interstate commerce has expanded
since its original drafting. The inquiry demands a determination of whether or not the regulated
activity is economic. Economic activities can be viewed in the aggregate whereas non-economic
activities can be regulated only if they affect interstate commerce on their own. See United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
152. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1203.
153. Id. at 1203-04.
154. Id. at 1204 (further noting that "[g]iven slaves' intensely deplorable treatment and slav-
ery's lasting effects, nearly every hurtful thing one human could do to another and nearly every
disadvantaged state of being might be analogized to slavery-and thereby labeled a badge or inci-
dent of slavery under Jones's rational determination test").
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incidents of slavery.155 Thus, it will be up to the Supreme Court to bring
the Thirteenth Amendment enforcement power in line with these other
limiting cases if it so chooses.
156
C. Jones's Rational-Determination Test
As Hatch made clear, after Jones it is for Congress to rationally de-
termine what the badges and incidents of slavery are in order to enact
enforcement legislation against them under Section Two of the Thir-
teenth Amendment.157 The troubling issue, however, remains: how does
the rational-determination test from Jones match up with the more recent
approach to limit congressional authority not only to enact legislation in
a certain area, but also to define the scope of that area? In City of Boerne,
the Supreme Court recognized that Congress, under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, has a similar power to the enforcement provi-
sion of the Thirteenth Amendment.'58 However, the Court held that the
enforcement provision of the Fourteenth Amendment provided Congress
only with the power to enforce, not the power to determine what amounts
to a constitutional violation. 59 A similar approach to the enforcement
provision of the Thirteenth Amendment would render the ration-
al-determination test from Jones an unconstitutional expansion of con-
gressional power. As the Court in City of Boerne mentioned, "While the
line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions
and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not
easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining
where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed."'160 So, again, it
remains to be seen what the Supreme Court may do with Jones and the
rational-determination test's expansion of the power explicitly granted by
the Thirteenth Amendment. The power as it currently exists under the
Thirteenth Amendment o legislate against he badges and incidents of
slavery is extremely important and worthwhile. Creating hate-crime stat-
utes should be within congressional power.
155. Id. The Tenth Circuit made note, however, that even in light of the seemingly broad scope
of Congress's power under Jones, the Hate Crimes Act is not the sort of overly broad frightening
legislation that should be called into question under limiting cases such as City ofBoerne, Lopez, and
Morrison. See id. at 1205-06. The Tenth Circuit articulated that the limited scope of the Hate Crimes
Act incorporated by Congress into the statute itself sufficiently narrows its applicability. Id. at 1205
(noting that the statute requires inquiry into the salient characteristics of the victim, the state of mind
of the person subjecting the victim to the conduct, and the conduct itself).
156. Hatch, 722 F.3d at 1205.
157. Id. at 1201.
158. Id. at 1202. Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "Congress shall
have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 5.
159. City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997).
160. Id. at 519-20.
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D. Should the Thirteenth Amendment Be Subject to the Same Limits as
the Fourteenth Amendment?
If the Supreme Court chooses to further determine the scope of the
Thirteenth Amendment, it will have to look very closely at the ramifica-
tions of limiting congressional power. If the Court someday answers the
call of the Tenth Circuit, it should not overturn Jones to bring the Thir-
teenth Amendment in line with the Fourteenth Amendment and City of
Boerne. The argument that the similar language of the enforcement pro-
visions of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments warrants similar
treatment with regard to limiting Congress's enforcement powers ignores
that the two Amendments are extremely different. The Amendments dif-
fer in subject matter and scope, making the application of precedent from
one to the other unwarranted and unwise.
61
Jones and the Thirteenth Amendment are different from all other
areas of congressional power because they deal with the badges and inci-
dents of slavery. The Fourteenth Amendment's protections and the en-
forcement power addressed by City of Boerne (and relied on by Hatch in
his federalism arguments) are general and apply to extremely broad are-
as. The Fourteenth Amendment's scope continues to be molded and
shaped in modem society.'62 The Thirteenth Amendment is different
because its scope is much more narrow and defined. 63 It is limited to
slavery.
Slavery was possibly the darkest time in the history of the United
States, and its elimination was so important that it has its own specific
amendment.164 The Court should not solve the theoretical problem of
overly broad congressional power by overturning Jones and stopping
congressional power to define the badges and incidents of slavery. In
addition to the Thirteenth Amendment's inherent limit that the Four-
teenth Amendment lacks-slavery-congressional determinations under
Jones must still be rational. Is it not enough that under Jones, Congress's
determination that something constitutes a badge or incident of slavery
must be rational? A relation to slavery and the rationality of Congress's
161. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.").
162. See generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013) (applying the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause to public university admissions procedures);
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (incorporating the Second Amendment as
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003) (applying the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due process protections to private life-
style decisions).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
164. See Alexander Tsesis, Interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment, II U. PA. J. CONST. L.
1337, 1337-38 (2009).
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decision are its limits, and that rationality remains for Article III courts to
determine whenever the Thirteenth Amendment power is expanded to a
new area.
CONCLUSION
Although the Thirteenth Amendment is often forgotten and is usual-
ly viewed as a relic of history, as the Tenth Circuit and the Supreme
Court cases cited within Hatch have shown, it is very much alive in
modem American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court decisions expand-
ing the enforcement power under the Thirteenth Amendment demon-
strate its vitality through time. The Tenth Circuit's recognition of Thir-
teenth Amendment-based congressional power in Hatch showcases the
Amendment's recent revival and also its significance and meaning in
today's society. Unfettered federal governmental power is a concern
rooted in the formation of the United States,165 and limits on authority
should exist where governmental power is undefined. However, compar-
isons may not be made among all things, and where power is restricted
already, over-restriction may be detrimental. The Thirteenth Amend-
ment, and the cases interpreting it, clearly shows it is limited by its sub-
ject matter, and its reach may not extend beyond what is rationally relat-
ed to slavery. Notwithstanding that the Amendment has proved itself
important in modern American society, its internal limits alone should be
sufficient to withstand future judicial scrutiny. But with the existence of
arguments proclaiming a potential for broad congressional authority and
discretion under the Thirteenth Amendment, it is all but certain that dis-
cussion of the Thirteenth Amendment will continue to be a topic in cases
to come.
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